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Changing Times: Changing Demands
The Honorable Richard Linn
I would like to thank the SMU Dedman School of Law for the invitation
to speak before you today. I am delighted to be here and to share with you
some thoughts about the changing face of intellectual-property law and the
work of the Federal Circuit.
We hear a lot about change these days: change in our economy, global
climate change, change in the Middle East, and profound change in our pat-
ent laws. This last discussion of change recently culminated in significant
legislative reform of our patent statutes., This is not surprising. Over the past
thirty years, the business world shifted most of America's corporate assets
from hard assets to intellectual property-particularly patents.2 This has
placed greater importance on patent law and the role of the patent system in
stimulating innovation, and it has resulted in a vigorous re-examination of
virtually every aspect of our patent system. 3 Even before the recent passage
of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act,4 the winds of change were sweep-
ing across the intellectual-property landscape. Several decisions of the Su-
preme Court and the Federal Circuit-particularly over the past five years-
have brought about fundamental changes in almost every aspect of patent
practice.5 In my opinion, the practice of patent law has undergone more sig-
nificant changes in the past five years than in any time since the formation of
1. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284
(2011).
2. See Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Remarks at the Stanford Institute for Eco-
nomic Policy Research Economic Summit: Intellectual Property Rights (Feb.
27, 2004), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/
2004/200402272/default.htm ("In recent decades ... the fraction of the total
output of our economy that is essentially conceptual rather than physical has
been rising. This trend has, of necessity, shifted the emphasis in asset valuation
from physical property to intellectual property and to the legal rights that inhere
in intellectual property.").
3. See Alan S. Gutterman, Changes to U.S. Patent Laws Finally Approved, 10
BUSINESS COUNSELOR UPDATE 2 (2011).
4. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act.
5. See, e.g., KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415 (2007) (expanding
the scope of obviousness); MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118,
137 (2007) (making it easier to file declaratory judgment actions); eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 394 (2006) (requiring consideration of
all four equitable factors before granting an injunction against accused infring-
ers); Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 446, 447 (2007) (restrict-
ing actions for infringement abroad); Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632
F.3d 1292, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (eliminating the twenty-five percent rule of
thumb for damages); Therasense, Inc. v. Beckton, Dickinson and Co., 649 F.3d
1276, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (heightening the "but for" test for materiality);
Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 653 F.3d
1329, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (deciding patent eligibility of DNA sequences).
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the Federal Circuit nearly thirty years ago. For example, in any infringement
case, from the patentee's side on regularly sees issues dealing with injunctive
relief, damages, willfulness, and attorneys' fees.6 From the accused in-
fringer's side, one typically sees issues of anticipation, enablement, obvi-
ousness, indefiniteness, written description, and inequitable conduct.7 In
virtually every one of these areas, there have been significant decisions with
profound effects over the past five years. 8
For example, this past January in Uniloc v. Microsoft,9 the Federal Cir-
cuit did away with the so-called 25% rule of thumb on damages.0 The pre-
mise of that rule of thumb was that in every hypothetical reasonable-royalty
negotiation, regardless of how important or unimportant the patent might be,
and regardless of whether the patent covers the entire product or just a small
part, the parties would begin their negotiations with the assumption that an
accused infringer would be willing to pay the patentee an amount equal to
25% of all anticipated profits as a reasonable royalty."I In our ruling, we held
the 25% rule, as a general rule of thumb, was fundamentally flawed under the
Supreme Court's Daubert standard12 because it bore no relation to the facts
and circumstances of a particular case and was, therefore, inadmissible as a
matter of law.13 This means that plaintiffs in patent suits now have to prove
facts that actually support the value of their inventions to justify damage
requests predicated on a reasonable-royalty theory.'4
6. See Spectralytics, Inc. v. Cordis Corp., 649 F.3d 1336, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
7. See, e.g., Tech. Licensing Corp. v. Videotek, Inc., 545 F.3d 1316, 1337-38
(Fed. Cir. 2008); Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., 550 F.3d 1075, 1084-85
(Fed. Cir. 2008).
8. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 415; MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 137; eBay, 547 U.S. at
394; Microsoft, 550 U.S. at 446-47; Uniloc, 632 F.3d at 1315; Therasense, 649
F.3d at 1291; Ass'n for Molecular Pathology, 653 F.3d at 1350.
9. Uniloc, 632 F.3d at 1292.
10. Id. at 1315.
II. See id. at 1312-13.
12. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993) ("General
acceptance is not a necessary precondition to the admissibility of scientific evi-
dence under the Federal Rules of Evidence, but the Rules of Evidence-espe-
cially Rule 702-do assign to the trial judge the task of ensuring that an
expert's testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task
at hand.").
13. Uniloc, 632 F.3d at 1315.
14. See id.
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In Therasense, Inc. v. Beckton, Dickinson and Co.,15 in May, the Federal
Circuit court sitting en banc clarified the law on inequitable conduct.16
Before Therasense was decided, in virtually every case, accused infringers
would comb the patentees' files and the record of proceedings in the Patent
Office to see if they could find any evidence that information possessed by
applicants or their attorneys was withheld from the examiner.17 If such evi-
dence was found, it was argued that the withholding of that information was
a deliberate attempt to mislead the examiner and, thus, was inequitable con-
duct-a kind of unclean hands.18 While the odds of establishing inequitable
conduct were not high,'9 the reward if such a defense succeeded was enor-
mous. 2 0 A finding of inequitable conduct rendered the entire patent unen-
forceable, not just the specific claims.21 The reward was so great and the
assertion of the defense was so widespread that it was frequently referred to
in articles and even judicial opinions as a "plague.'22
The court finally decided that it was time to revisit the issue en banc.2
3
In the Therasense decision, the court established a heightened but-for test for
materiality, which said that the failure to submit to the examiner a prior-art
reference was not material and thus could not support a holding of inequita-
ble conduct unless a patent would not have been allowed "but for" the with-
holding, or unless there was other evidence of affirmative egregious
misconduct.24 Patentees no longer need to waste time, money, and risk hav-
ing their patents declared unenforceable based on inconsequential mistakes
or actions that in the past had been trumped up in litigation as intentional
attempts to mislead the examiner.25 I dare say that the plague of inequitable
conduct has been eradicated.
15. Therasense, Inc. v. Beckton, Dickinson and Co., 649 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir.
2011).
16. Id. at 1291-1293.
17. See Christian E. Mammen, Controlling the "Plague": Reforming the Doctrine
of Inequitable Conduct, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1329, 1334 (2009).
18. See id. at 1333-34.
19. id. at 1357.
20. Id. at 1332.
21. Id.
22. See, e.g., Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed.
Cir. 1988) ("We add one final word: the habit of charging inequitable conduct
in almost every major patent case has become an absolute plague."); see also
Nolan-Stevaux, Inequitable Conduct Claims in the 21st Century: Combating
the Plague, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 147, 155 n.55 (2005) (listing authorities).
23. Therasense, Inc. v. Beckton, Dickinson and Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1285 (Fed.
Cir. 2011).
24. Id. at 1291-93.
25. See id.
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At the end of July, in Association for Molecular Pathology26-com-
monly referred to as the Myriad case-the court decided the patent eligibility
of isolated DNA gene sequences. 27 The district judge in this case ruled that
the patents, which cover isolated DNA fragments as well as methods for
comparing a patient's gene sequence with a normal sequence, were invalid
because the DNA-composition claims covered a product of nature, and the
method claims covered an abstract mental step.28 This ruling made the head-
lines of every major newspaper in the country and opened a furious debate
over where to draw the line in deciding the patent eligibility of gene-related
inventions at the heart of the biotech industry.29 At the end of July, the Fed-
eral Circuit, in a two-to-one decision, held that all but one of Myriad Genet-
ics, Inc.'s (Myriad) method claims were invalid, but it reversed the district
court and held some of the isolated DNA-gene-sequence claims to be patent
eligible.30 The decision prompted separate opinions from each of the three
judges on the panel.31 Judge Lourie found the isolated gene sequence recited
in those claims patent eligible because it was a distinct chemical moiety not
found in nature.32 Judge Moore also concluded that it was a distinct chemical,
placing emphasis on how much more useful the sequence was after being
isolated.33 Further, Judge Moore also emphasized longstanding United States
Patent and Trademark Office practice and legislative history to conclude that
it would be wrong to upset settled industry expectations in the absence of
clear guidance from Congress.34 In contrast, Judge Bryson, the dissenting
judge, felt that Myriad's claims to isolated gene sequences were no more
patent eligible than leaves snapped from a tree. 35 It is likely that the parties
will seek review at the Supreme Court, so keep your eyes open for news on
this case.
26. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 653 F.3d
1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
27. Id. at 1350.
28. Id. at 1342.
29. See, e.g., John Schwartz and Andrew Pollack, Judge Invalidates Human Gene
Patent, N.Y. TIMES. March 29, 2010, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.
com/2010/03/30/business/30gene.html.
30. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology, 653 F.3d at 1334.
31. Id. at 1333.
32. Id. at 1351-53.
33. Id. at 1364-66 (Moore, J., concurring in part).
34. Id. at 1366-73 (Moore, J., concurring in part).
35. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology, 653 F.3d at 1377 (Bryson, J., dissenting)
("[E]xtracting a gene is akin to snapping a leaf from a tree.").
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In November 2011, the Federal Circuit is scheduled to rehear en banc
two joint-infringement cases (Akamai36 and McKesson37) to answer the ques-
tion of whether infringement can be found when separate entities each per-
form separate steps of a method claim, and under what circumstances, if any,
each of the parties involved would be liable for infringement. 38 A typical
method claim in which this issue is presented is a claim directed to an In-
ternet-based process having steps performed by a service provider as well as
steps performed by a customer or user. 39
These changes have come about due to a more thorough re-examination
by the Federal Circuit of some of its earlier precedents, and because of a
more robust interest on the part of the Supreme Court in the decisions of the
Federal Circuit in patent cases.40 The Federal Circuit's review was prompted,
in part, by a heightened sophistication of the patent bar and by recognition
that perhaps some of the bolder decisions from the earlier days of the court
are no longer appropriate given today's economic conditions.am Undoubtedly,
the current economic downturn has also played a part in causing greater
awareness in the patent system, which is critical to the nation's economic and
technological growth.42
The increased interest of the Supreme Court in the patent system is ap-
parent.43 In general, the Supreme Court grants only about 1% of certiorari
petitions it receives.4 But in the last five years, the Court granted nearly 5%
36. Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 629 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir.
2010) (vacated for rehearing en banc).
37. McKesson Techs., Inc. v. Epic Sys. Corp., No. 2010-1291, 2011 WL 1365548
(Fed. Cir. April 12, 2011) (vacated for rehearing en banc).
38. Akamai Techs., Inc. v. MIT, 419 F. App'x 989 (Fed. Cir. 2011); McKesson
Techs. Inc. v. Epic Sys. Corp., No. 2010-1291, 2011 WL 2173401 (Fed. Cir.
May 26, 2011).
39. See Nari Lee, Fragmented Infringement of Computer Program Patents in the
Global Economy, 48 IDEA 345, 348 (2008).
40. Gary M. Hoffman & Robert L. Kinder, Supreme Court Review of Federal Cir-
cuit Patent Cases-Placing the Recent Scrutiny in Context and Determining If
It Will Continue, 20 DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 227, 228-29
(2010).
41. Id. at 231, 233.
42. Id. at 276.
43. See United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Filings of Patent
Infringement Appeals from the U.S. District Courts (Oct. 30, 2011), available
at http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/images/stories/the-courtlstatistics/Caseload-
patent infringe_02- I1 .pdf.
44. David C. Thompson & Melanie F. Wachtell, An Empirical Analysis of Supreme
Court Certiorari Petition Procedures: The Call for Response and the Call for
the Views of the Solicitor General, 16 GEO. MASON L. REv. 237, 241 (2009),
available at http://www.georgemasonlawreview.org/doc/16-2_Wachtell.pdf.
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of the certiorari petitions from the Federal Circuit-almost five times more
than the average from other circuits. 45 About one-third of those were patent
cases.4 6 The pace of the Supreme Court's engagement with patent cases is
showing no sign of abatement as the Supreme Court has already ruled on
three cases from the Federal Circuit during this past term alone47 I think
there are several reasons for this. First, there is no question that the Supreme
Court fully appreciates the importance of IP to the nation's economy.4 8 Sec-
ond, the Supreme Court is reminding us that it, and not the Federal Circuit,
has the final say and is giving us guidance that promoting uniformity in pat-
ent decisions does not mean creating patent-specific, bright-line rules outside
the mainstream of federal law.49 Third, the patent bar has become more
highly sophisticated in presenting issues to the Court, and Supreme Court
clerks are more keenly aware of patent law and intellectual-property law in
general. 50
While the Supreme Court's recent patent opinions are generally viewed
as swinging the patent pendulum away from patentees and towards accused
infringers,51 a consistent theme of the Court's opinions is the continual en-
dorsement of past Supreme Court patent opinions and condemnation of pat-
ent-specific, bright-line rules in favor of flexible mainstream dogma.52 It is in
this area where I find a fundamental difference in the approaches taken by
45. Honorable Arthur J. Gajarsa & Lawrence P. Cogswell, III, The Federal Circuit
and the Supreme Court, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 821, 822 (2006).
46. Id.
47. See Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P'ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011); Bd. of Trs.
Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2188
(2011); Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060 (2011).
48. See Tony Dutra, Judge Lourie Welcomes Supreme Court Review of Federal
Circuit's Patent Decisions, BNA (Oct. 27, 2011), http://www.bna.com/judge-
lourie-welcomes-n 12884904024/.
49. See, e.g., Timothy R. Holbrook, The Supreme Court's Complicity in Federal
Circuit Formalism, 20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 9-10
(2003); see also Rob Merges, The Court's Patent Jurisprudence, SCOTUS-
BLOG (Oct. 6, 2011, 10:08am), http://www.scotusblog.com/coinmunity/the-
supreme-court's-patent-jurisprudence.
50. Cf Merges, supra note 49.
51. See, e.g., KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007) (expanding the
scope of obviousness); Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437 (2007)
(restricting actions for infringement abroad); MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech,
Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007) (making it easier to file declaratory judgment ac-
tions); eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (requiring
consideration of all four equitable factors before granting an injunction against
accused infringers).
52. See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010) (rejecting the machine or
transformation test as the exclusive test for patentability of methods).
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the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court in deciding cases. The Federal
Circuit deals with decisions affecting business leaders who are looking for
clear answers and unambiguous guidance.53 Business people like bright-line
rules.54 It is easier to make business decisions when the implications and
consequences of those decisions are well known.55 We see this in the dis-
putes that come before us day-in and day-out and in the regular exchanges
we have with the patent bar, including with members in both private practice
and in-house. The Supreme Court, on the other hand, deals with legal princi-
ples and the policy implications they engender.56 The Supreme Court is more
accustomed to making general rules that can be applied on a case-by-case
basis to the facts and circumstances as they arise.57 For the Supreme Court,
bright-line rules are seldom endorsed.58 This difference in perspective may
account for some of the recent differences in the decisions of the respective
courts and gives me some reason to be concerned about future Supreme
Court decisions that may overlook the importance of, and the need for, more
specific guidance.
This turbulent landscape is likely to continue for some time. In fact, in
June the Supreme Court granted certiorari in three Federal Circuit cases:
Caraco Pharmaceutical Laboratories v. Novo Nordisk, dealing with counter-
claims in patent cases under the Hatch-Waxman Act;59 Mayo v. Prometheus,
dealing with patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101 ;60 and Kappos v. Hyatt,
dealing with de novo review of appeals from the Patent Office to the district
court under 35 U.S.C. § 145.61
The significance of these changes to the business community is evident
from an examination of three key decisions: KSR v. Teleflex, dealing with the
53. See Joe McFaul, My Philosophy-Why the "Bright Line?", THE BRIGHT LINE




56. See David Weigel, Supreme Court Breakfast Table Entry 15, SLATE (July 1,
2010, 1:25pm), http://www.slate.com/articles/life/the-breakfasttable/features/
2010/supreme-court_breakfast-table/pity the federal circuit for bilski.html.
57. See id.
58. See James J. Barta Jr. & Steven G. Holdener, Supreme Court Looks Dimly on
Bright-Line Patent-Eligibility Test, MISSOURI LAWYERS WEEKLY (July 12,
2010), http://www.armstrongteasdale.com/files/Uploads/Documents?Bilski%
20Article%20for%20website-8876889- 1.pdf.
59. Novo Nordisk A/S v. Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd., 601 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir.
2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 3057 (2011).
60. Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., Inc., 628 F.3d 1347 (Fed.
Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 3027 (2011).
61. Hyatt v. Kappos, 625 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 3064
(2011).
2011]
SMU Science and Technology Law Review
test for obviousness;62 eBay v. MercExchange, dealing with the test for in-
junctive relief;63 and In re Seagate, dealing with the standard applicable to
prove willful infringement.64 I would like to briefly touch upon each of these
cases. There are many other noteworthy cases-including several more re-
cent decisions-but due to the limited time I have, I will restrict my remarks
to the holdings and possible implications of these three cases because of their
broad application and effect.
In KSR, the Supreme Court reviewed the test for obviousness under 35
U.S.C. § 103.65 The Supreme Court rejected what it perceived to be a rigid
approach previously taken by our court in applying the so-called "teaching,
suggestion, and motivation test," which was the standard by which obvi-
ousness was determined for at least a decade.66 The Supreme Court observed
that "when it first established the requirement of demonstrating a teaching,
suggestion, or motivation to combine known elements in order to show that
the combination is obvious, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals cap-
tured a helpful insight."67 It then noted, however, that helpful insights need
not become rigid and mandatory formulas, and "when a court transforms a
general principle into a rigid rule that limits the obviousness inquiry, as the
Court of Appeals did here, it errs."69
The Supreme Court summed up its position on obviousness in observing
that what is important is to use common sense and to identify a reason that
would have prompted a person of ordinary skill in the relevant field to com-
bine the elements in the way the claimed new invention does.69 It added that
''any need or problem known in the field of endeavor at the time of invention
and addressed by the patent can provide a reason for combining the elements
in the manner claimed."70
The net result of KSR is that defendants have a renewed interest in rais-
ing and pressing obviousness contentions despite the high "clear and con-
62. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
63. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
64. In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
65. KSR, 550 U.S. at 400.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 417.
68. Id. at 418.
69. See id. at 420-21.
70. KSR, 550 at 420-2 1.
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vincing" standard that applies to validity challenges. 7' We are already seeing
this in recent cases filed in our court. 72
In eBay, the Supreme Court rejected the categorical grant of injunctive
relief in patent cases and held that in those cases, just as in other cases, a
plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction must demonstrate 1) that it has suf-
fered irreparable injury; 2) that remedies available at law are inadequate; 3)
that the balance of hardships warrants injunctive relief; and 4) that the public
interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.7 3 What the Su-
preme Court did not tell us is what happens after infringement is found and a
court determines that the equitable remedy of a permanent injunction is not
warranted.74 This presented patentees and the courts with interesting chal-
lenges that we continue to address. The bottom line for patentees is that they,
like all other plaintiffs, have to toe the line and be prepared to make a con-
vincing showing on each of the four equitable factors, including irreparable
harm.75 This presents difficult challenges, particularly to non-practicing pat-
entees, and alters some of the leverage patentees assumed they enjoyed
before the eBay decision.
In re Seagate Tech., LLC presented our court with the opportunity to
reconsider the duty of due care owed to patentees and the standard for deter-
mining when infringement is willful and subject to treble damages.76 The
case stemmed from the patentee's assertion of willful infringement and the
accused infringer's good-faith reliance on the advice of counsel.77 Due to the
abuses we perceived in the routine allegation of willful infringement, the
tension it produced between assertion by the accused infringer of the attor-
ney-client privilege, and the reliance on the advice of counsel, we eliminated
the affirmative duty of due care and held that proof of willful infringement-
which permits enhanced damages-requires at least a showing of objective
recklessness.78 We also remarked that in the context of willful infringement,
there is no affirmative obligation to obtain an opinion of counsel.79 Following
Seagate, there continues to be some debate over the application of the objec-
71. See Jeffrey McIntyre & Jonathan Fritz, Patent Applicants Beware of KSR's
Impact on Patent Prosecution, WTN NEWS (Oct. 17, 2007), http://wtnnews.
com/articles/4254/.
72. See, e.g., Unigene Labs., Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 655 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
73. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391-92 (2006).
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
77. Id.
78. See id. at 1371.
79. See id.
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tively reckless standard and the parameters of willful infringement.80 The one
thing that is no longer in debate, however, is that patentees can no longer rely
on a determination of willfulness and enhanced damages merely because in-
fringement was found against an accused that had prior notice of the patent. 8'
As a result of the preceding three cases, patentees will be likely to have
to confront more obviousness challenges, will be more challenged to obtain
injunctive relief, and will be less likely to obtain enhanced damage awards
based on willfulness, as was common just a few years ago.8 2 Thus, these
cases will cause patentees to reassess their strategies and to revalue their
patent portfolios.
Patentees do not only struggle to cope with recent decisions of the Su-
preme Court and the Federal Circuit, but also continue to suffer needlessly
from self-inflicted wounds.83 These are the walking wounded, who regularly
report to the MASH units-the district courts-for help. If they do not get
the help they need at the district court MASH unit, they come to the general
hospital-the Federal Circuit-to cure all that ails them.
What self-inflicted wounds am I talking about? There are two in particu-
lar I want to highlight. The first relates to the continuing propensity of paten-
tees-particularly in the electrical and mechanical arts-to disclose in their
applications only one embodiment of the invention while arguing that the
claims cover something broader than the one disclosed embodiment might
suggest. 84 Scientists and engineers are familiar with the concept that an area
cannot be defined by a single point, or even two points. To define an area
80. Cf Jason Rantanen, iLOR v. Google: Rejected Claim Construction Does Not
Render Case "Objectively Baseless," PATENT LEGAL BLOG (Nov. 6, 2011,
3:08AM), www.patentlyo.com.
81. See id.
82. See KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007); eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006); In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497
F.3d 1360, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
83. See, e.g., Wamer-Jenkinson Co., Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17,
32-33 (1997); Honeywell Int'l, Inc. v. ITT Indus., Inc., 452 F.3d 1312, 1318
(Fed. Cir. 2006).
84. See, e.g., Honeywell, 452 F.3d at 1318 (limiting the claim term "fuel injection
system component" to a "fuel filter" when the written description indicates
"that the fuel filter is not a preferred embodiment, but only an embodiment");
Chimie v. PPG Indus., 402 F.3d 1371, 1379-80 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (holding that
it was not improper to define the terms "dust-free and non-dusting" based on
the description in the preferred embodiment when that was "the only disclosure
on the subject made in the patent"); Alloc, Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 342
F.3d 1361, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (reading in a "play" limitation into a claim for
laminate floor panels when "the patents do not show or suggest any systems
without play"); Modine Mfg. Co. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 75 F.3d 1545,
1551 (1996), abrogated on other grounds by Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku
Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (limiting a claim element
[Vol. XV
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requires at least three points. It is surprising then, that patent attorneys-who
are trained both in law and in science or engineering-often forget this three-
point concept in drafting patent applications.85 Careful prosecutors include in
patent specifications not merely one embodiment of an invention, but multi-
ple embodiments to better illustrate the full area of the discovery embraced
by the claims. This is a sound practice that helps to inform the public of the
proper scope of the claims, and avoids uncertainty and interpretive disputes.
I have no idea why so many patentees continue to limit the number of
embodiments disclosed when, in so many cases we hear, the entire contro-
versy is about the scope of a claim-which is supported only by a single,
disclosed embodiment.86 This can all be avoided simply by disclosing more
than one embodiment. Granted, several Federal Circuit cases establish quite
clearly that the scope of patent claims is not necessarily limited to the single
embodiment disclosed.87 Yet, why get into a dispute over this just because an
enhanced disclosure is not absolutely necessary under our precedent? It is a
matter of being aware of the legal landscape and being prudent in applying
that understanding, even as early as the patent application preparation stage.
Patentees, who expect to enforce their patents in litigation with a broad range
of coverage and only disclose at the application stage a single embodiment,
are shooting themselves in the foot. The uncertainty of single-embodiment
specifications has brought us a steady stream of cases, and I urge all of you
not to shoot yourselves or your clients in the foot by disclosing only one
embodiment-particularly in mechanical and electrical cases. 88
The second example of a self-inflicted wound is the continuing practice
of adding terminology to claims, particularly after an interview, and placing
the claims in condition for allowance without explaining the reason for the
change or pointing out where in the specification support for the added lan-
guage can be found.89 Again, in case after case before our court, we are
to the numerical range disclosed in the preferred embodiment "when the pre-
ferred embodiment is described in the specification as the invention itself").
85. See, e.g., Honeywell, 452 F.3d at 1318; Chimie, 402 F.3d at 1379-80; Alloc,
342 F.3d at 1370.
86. See, e.g., Honeywell, 452 F.3d at 1318; Chimie, 402 F.3d at 1379-80; Alloc,
342 F.3d at 1370.
87. See, e.g., Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en
banc); Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 906 (Fed. Cir.
2004); Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1327-28 (Fed.
Cir. 2002).
88. See, e.g., Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323; Liebel-Flarsheim, 358 F.3d at 906;
Teleflex, 299 F.3d at 1327-28.
89. See, e.g., Wamer-Jenkinson Co., Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17,
32-33 (1997) (applying prosecution history estoppel when the patentee
amended a claim to add the phrase "at a pH from approximately 6.0 to 9.0"
without "reveal[ing] the reason for including the lower pH limit," and holding
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called upon to construe the scope of claim language, which appears nowhere
else but in the claims.90 Without any support in the written description, we
are left to infer meaning from parts of the specification that often do not
directly relate to the limitation in question, or glean understanding from the
patent-prosecution history leading up to the amendment. 9 1 These are often
poor guides for interpretation, frequently leading to protracted and costly liti-
gation, not to mention unpredictable outcomes. 92 Here again, the wound is
self-inflicted, and patentees are well advised to avoid shooting themselves in
the foot by leaving the meaning of critical limitations to unguided inference.
The message for those who regularly write and prosecute patent applica-
tions for clients is that, while the swinging of the patent pendulum of court
decisions is largely beyond any patentee's ability to alter, there are things
that are entirely within your control. Such things include multiple embodi-
ments in patent applications to make broad construction of claim terms more
likely, and providing support or an explanation for claim terms added during
prosecution. Those things you can control; and they will help your client
avoid going through life as a walking-wounded patentee.
This means that, to be successful in a career in patent law, you must do
more than just read the leading cases and master the basics. If you do no
more than that, you will be no better than your peers, and you will be ill-
equipped to represent sophisticated clients. To succeed in today's climate and
stand out from the crowd, you must at least keep up with every decision of
the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit. This means watching the Federal
Circuit website every day for the 11:00 a.m. release of opinions, reading
those opinions carefully and thoughtfully, and appreciating the implications
of the holdings contained in those opinions. If you are litigating cases, having
a mastery of the law and the changes in the law as they occur will be invalua-
ble. If you are preparing, filing, and prosecuting patent applications, your
understanding of the implications of the things you do or say in those appli-
cations will have a profound effect on how well those patents, once they
issue, will stand up in court.
that "the better rule is to place the burden on the patent holder to establish the
reason for an amendment required during patent prosecution.").
90. See, e.g., Dana Corp. v. Am. Axle & Mfg., Inc., 110 Fed. Appx. 871, 874-78
(Fed. Cir. Aug. 27, 2004) (grappling with the proper construction of a claim
term added during prosecution when "there [was] no textual description or dis-
cussion of that claim element in the specification.").
91. Id.
92. Id.
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